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Green War Banners in Central Copenhagen:
A Recent Political Struggle Over
Interpretation—And Some Implications
for Art Interpretation as Such
Frederik Stjernfelt
Abstract This paper addresses the issue of the role of Quasi-Urteile—Quasi-
Propositions—in the arts. Stemming from Ingarden’s Aesthetics, the notion of
Quasi-Propositions addresses the idea that artworks employ proposition-like struc-
tures even if their reference deviates—to larger or lesser degrees—from that
of propositions in non-arts contexts. Here, the Peircean doctrine of Dicisigns—
propositions—is introduced, with a much wider range of sign vehicle types able
to instantiate propositional content, such as signs involving pictures, diagrams,
gestures, etc. Taking a particular Danish controversy—that of a military “cartouche”
at a Copenhagen barracks—as an analytical example, the chapter argues that filling-
in is constrained by context, genre as well as aspects of the work itself, making it
possible to categorize certain filling-ins as wrong, going against the potentialities of
the work. The case, simultaneously, makes necessary a softening up of Ingarden’s
rigid distinction between fictions and non-fictions.
Keywords Semiotics • Art • Indeterminacy • Quasi-propositions • Filling-out •
Cartouche
A classic stance in the philosophy of art and fiction is that fictional artworks take
the character of quasi-propositions. That terminology is due to Roman Ingarden’s
influential Das literarische Kunstwerk (1931)—his notion of “Quasi-Urteile.”1
1Peirce also uses the term “quasi-proposition,” albeit for quite another purpose also relevant for
this paper. In him, quasi-propositions are propositions simpler than full, symbolic propositions;
his examples include fossils, weathercocks, and paintings with legends, and many cross-over
propositions mixing different means of expression. The upshot is that the range of signs able to
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Being a philosophical realist (cf. Ingarden 1955–1974), he took a strong interest in
distinguishing real objects from fictive objects, and, consequently, real propositions
from quasi-propositions. The work of fiction includes seeming propositions that,
however, only have the status of make-believe as both author and reader realize they
do not directly refer to the real world nor to facts in any more restricted universe
of discourse subset of that world. This does not imply, however, that fictions may
not involve real propositions as well, referring, e.g. to established knowledge about
the topography, period, persons of the universe of discourse etc. where the fictional
narrative takes place. It also does not imply, moreover, that artworks in general are
fictions; many artworks, poetry, essays, paintings, photographs, movies, etc. involve
propositions in the literal, non-quasi sense of the word, and need not involve any
fictional propositions at all.
An orthogonal, independent issue in Ingarden’s aesthetics and linguistics is that
of filling-out, of concretization. Propositions, in art as elsewhere, are schematic and
involve ideal elements—in Ingarden’s terminology: “Unbestimmtkeitsstellen,” loci
of indeterminacy. That implies that art—as human representations at large—consists
of schematic, general (that is, underdetermined) expressions to various degrees. In
consuming an artwork, however, the observer to some degree fills in these gaps, as
it were, with the result that his or her experience may approach that of real-world
perception. Not any old filling-out is appropriate, however; some may go against the
genre, against real-world information, against information or hints already given by
the artwork, while others are free for the reader to specify while still others filling-
outs are motivated or supported in more or less explicit ways by the genre or artwork
itself—realizing “schematized aspects” which are contained, as potentialities, in
the work itself. Beginning his investigation with the literary work of art in his
eponymous classic of 1931, Ingarden continued to generalize these insights to arts as
such, and, late in life, concisely summed up these groundbreaking ideas as follows:
Every work of art of whatever kind has the distinguishing feature that it is not the sort
of thing which is completely determined in every respect by the primary level varieties
of its qualities, in other words it contains within itself characteristic lacunae in definition,
areas of indeterminateness: it is a schematic creation. Furthermore not all its determinants,
components or qualities are in a state of actuality, but some of them are potential only.
In consequence of this a work of art requires an agent existing outside itself, that is an
observer, in order—as I express it—to render it concrete. Through his co-creative activity
in appreciation the observer sets himself as is commonly said to ‘interpret’ the work or, as
I prefer to say, to reconstruct it in its effective characteristics, and in doing this as it were
under the influence of suggestions coming from the work itself he fills out its schematic
structure, plenishing at least in part the areas of indeterminacy and actualizing various
elements which are as yet only in a state of potentiality. In this way there comes about
what I have called a ‘concretion’ of the work of art. (Ingarden 1964, p. 199)
express truth—definitory for Peircean propositions, called Dicisigns—is much broader than the
mainstream idea that the expression of proposition is confined to human language (see Peirce
1998, Chap. 20; Stjernfelt 2014). With its mixed-media combination of sculpture and symbols
(monogram, dates), the cartouche forms a quasi-proposition in this sense.
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In this paper, I shall discuss central issues in this field indicated by (quasi-)
propositions, real propositions, filling-out, and work potentialities with outset in
a small case-study of a particular work of art and an interpretation feud evolving
around it. In 2008, a minor political and aesthetic media fuss broke out in Denmark,
prompted by the public presentation of a classic, standard piece of military art in
Copenhagen. It concerned the unveiling on June 30th, 2008 of a bronze monument
at a barracks in Rosenborg Gardens, located in central Copenhagen as part of
the architectural complex around the 1606 royal castle of Rosenborg, during the
celebration events of the 350th anniversary of the Danish queen’s household
regiment—The Royal Life Guard; in Danish: “Dronningens Livregiment.” The
artwork presented to the public was a so-called “cartouche” in cast bronze, created
by Sven Erik Sjøtlow and gilded by Evelyn Iversen, donated to the barracks for the
occasion by the Association of Guardsmen, and presented, at the celebration event,
by the queen herself (Figs. 1 and 2).
Already before the unveiling ceremony, however, a protracted game of protest
had been taking place over years. In March 2008, a retired officer, Peter Horsten
of the Royal Life Guard, filed a protest against the donation and the mounting of
the cartouche on the barracks roof. Horsten claimed that the cartouche “celebrated
Islam” and thus constituted an “insult” to Danish troops at the time serving in Iraq
and Afghanistan.2 This was not Horsten’s first appearance with this claim. Horsten,
in fact, had protested to a variegated range of authorities ever since the first airings
of the plans pertaining to the cartouche—as early as 5 years before, in 2003. He
claimed that the bronze flags of the monument would, over the years, turn green with
age and thus come to represent the standards of victorious Islamist armies rather
than flags associated with the Royal Life Guard. His protests, however, had not
gained much support, despite being aimed at several Danish Ministers of Defense
and even sent to the queen herself. Only now, in 2008, his protests finally gained
momentum. Horsten explained that “All of the time I have found that it looked
hideous. But the worst thing is that I discovered, with horror, that the casting has
the green color of Islam.”3 Then the Danish MP Søren Krarup of the right-wing
“Danish People’s Party” entered the picture. Krarup is a local celebrity, a nationalist
right-wing Lutheran theologian, clergyman, and author, a leading proponent of a
Barthist theological movement known as “Tidehverv” (meaning roughly “Epoch”).
Krarup took up the protest of Horsten and filed, in Parliament, an official inquiry to
the Minister of Defence Søren Gade of the governing Danish liberal party Venstre.
His analysis of the cartouche was as follows: “It would rouse disgust in me. It is
ugly, and it could not avoid appearing as an Islamic symbol with the green color of
2http://www.avisen.dk/pensioneret-garder-anklager-livgarden-hylder-islam_8694.aspx
3“Jeg har hele tiden syntes, at den så hæslig ud. Men det værste er, at jeg til min store




Figs. 1 and 2 The cartouche on the roof of the Rosenborg barracks, in two different stages of
patination (Fig. 1 copyright Evelyn Iversen)
the banners,”4 he told the press. Instead, Krarup claimed, the traditional red-white
colors of the Danish national flag ought to dominate the cartouche. The Minister
of Defence, however, evaded the question in the Danish Parliament, but Krarup’s
intervention proved important in terms of media coverage. Thus, the interpretation
of an artwork became an official parliamentary issue and turned into a minor press
scandal covered in many Danish media.
4“Det ville vække afsky hos mig. Den er grim, og den kan ikke undgå at fremstå som et islamisk
symbol med de der grønne farver på fanerne” (my translation to English; Ritzau 2008), http://
politiken.dk/indland/politik/ECE487301/df-til-kamp-mod-groenne-faner/, 26 March 2008.
Green War Banners in Central Copenhagen: A Recent Political Struggle Over. . . 213
Fig. 3 Cartouche of
Thutmosis III, from a glazed
steatite scarab (between 1479





Semiotics also entered the picture. As a newly appointed professor at the Center
for Semiotics at the University of Aarhus, I was summoned to the national radio
network “Danmarks Radio” in order to analyze the cartouche. I said, of course,
that in bronze sculpture, metal color is generally not a carrier of meaning and,
consequently, the protesting officer and, with him, his political supporter, were in
the wrong. They argued against the potentialities indicated by the work itself (the
monogram of the Danish Queen) as well as by its context (a centrally located,
historical Danish barracks)—both of them pointing to the banners of the cartouche
representing, in fact, Danish national flags. The protests, so I claimed, formed an
example of overinterpretation on the part of the enraged officer, as it were. Or
perhaps a “creative” interpretation; a “strong” interpretation as Nietzscheans used
to say? In any case, his claim formed a filling-out going against the potentialities
indicated by the schematic artwork itself. Of course, I only had few minutes to
explain myself on the radio, so let me elaborate my argument a bit.
What is a cartouche, in the first place? Actually, its history goes back to
Ancient Egypt where hieroglyphic practice was to indicate divine or royal names
by inscribing them in an ovaline figurine closed by a tangent line at the bottom or at
the side (Fig. 3).
In hieroglyphic writing, thus, the cartouche depicts a rope encircling the names
elevated. The rope is said, in turn, to represent the circle of eternity, the so-called
“shen ring.” The use of the cartouche to highlight divine or royal names proved
important for Champollion’s famous interpretation of the hieroglyphs based on the
three-language Rosetta stone, making it possible for him to locate the same names in
the stone’s parallel texts in Hieroglyphic, Greek, and Demotic writing. Thus, a long
western tradition of a more or less ornamented frame used to sacralize or celebrate
a set of symbols, stylized icons, or letters took its beginning in Egyptian Antiquity.
From the Egyptian cartouche use, thus, a carved or cast ornamental tablet or panel
in the form of a scroll or frame enclosing an inscription or symbol came to indicate
the deification or holding in solemnity the reference objects of those signs. In ancient
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Rome or Greece, the Egyptian custom of adorning graves and coffins with names
of the deceased in a cartouche, so as to eternalize the deceased, was inherited and
developed, now often in the shape of rectangular cartouches, losing their original
motivation of depicting a sacred rope. Instead, the cutout, framed field came rather
to be interpreted as a military shield. Already in the Roman army, the decoration
of shields functioned as cartouches identifying the military unit wearing that shield.
Later, in medieval Europe, shield cartouches were generalized to celebrate nobility
and royal dynasties (in the European tradition of heraldry, originating in the time of
Charlemagne and strongly developing after the tenth century), buildings, churches,
etc. The heraldry of royal and noble families on the one side and military insignia
on the other thus share a common point of origin in the attempts of medieval
knights to distinguish themselves visually in the battle field—and, more peacefully,
in tournaments. The military use of cartouches developed into formal insignia
for military units on different levels, thus serving as visual predicates identifying
them. The use of the word “cartouche” for such signs may have originated with
Napoleon’s troops in Egypt where the visual similarity of the shape of hieroglyphic
sign with that of paper cartridges (French: cartouches) may have prompted the name,
first in French, later in English. The appearance of a cartouche on a soldier thus
identifies him (or a weapon, a barracks, a vehicle, etc.) as belonging to a particular
military unit, in effect serving as a proposition—a Peircean Dicisign—expressing
a claim, e.g.: “This is a soldier of Edward VII’s Indian Army, Supply & Transport
Regiment:”5
Correspondingly, cartouche insignia often appear on signs of military honor such
as medals, decorations, etc. This long and complicated history of the cartouche,
however, is not our main concern here; suffice it to say that the cartouche is an old
genre with certain stable characteristics. It aims at identifying some person, group
of persons, item, building, etc. as having a certain proper name or belonging to
5http://www.victorianwars.com/viewtopic.php?f=19&t=1896. A cartouche pouch in itself contains
cartridges, that is, cartouches. Peirce’s broad notion of propositions is functionally defined and
thus transgresses linguistically expressed propositions, involving signs which make truth claims
using pictures, diagrams, gestures, etc.—like the cartouche serving as a predicate in a proposition
involving as its subject the soldier wearing it, cf. Stjernfelt (2014).
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a certain unit, stock, or institution, often additionally describing the entity defined
and granting the relevant entity some authority, sacrality, or other elevated status. As
such, the cartouche is intrinsically propositional (or quasi-propositional in Peirce’s
sense of the word)—it forms a syntactical unit whose function is to claim that the
entity to which it is attached is, in fact, the one indicated by the name indicated,
given by a linguistic or pictorial index presented inside the framework of the
cartouche.6 Simultaneously, the cartouche celebrates the entity given that name—
the very application of the cartouche serves to ennoble the bearer of the name of
the cartouche, supported by the artful, aesthetic elaboration of the cartouche and
in many cases by the use of expensive materials. Thus, the cartouche is explicitly
propositional rather than quasi-propositional in the Ingardenian sense of the word—
of course, fictional cartouches can be made and have indeed been made but the
prototypical, traditional cartouche actually does function as an artwork that is
simultaneously a proposition with a real reference—it refers to, identifies, and to
some degree celebrates its bearer.
To return to the particular Danish Rosenborg Barracks cartouche, it thus func-
tions as piece of applied art claiming a proposition. The structure of the cartouche
as a whole contains three elements: a basic plinth with the time indication of “1658–
2008;” the central cartouche shield endowed with the queen’s monogram, headed by
the iconic crown of the Danish royal house7; surrounded by ten standards protruding
from behind the shield, five pointing obliquely fan-like upwards to each side. This is
a common structure for military cartouches—and not far from some of the heraldic
traditions also possessing a central shield with various codified support structures
around, behind and over it. The overall appearance of the cartouche is bronze; three
partial components of the cartouche, however, are emphasized, gilded with gold
leaf: the queen’s monogram, the crown over the shield, and the detailed, individual
tips of the ten banners identifying them as referring to the ten standards which the
Guard has received as gifts from different Danish monarchs during its existence.8
The proposition held forward by the cartouche thus refers to several entities,
explicitly and implicitly. It explicitly makes reference (1) to the present Danish
queen Margrethe II whose monogram appears centrally in the cartouche, just like
(2) the timespan 1658–2008 is explicitly presented on the cartouche, and (3) ten
existing flags in the ownership of the Guard, indicated by means of the individual
banner tips, identifying which regent donated the single flag.
6The proposition involving the cartouche and the object or person to which it is attached is thus
not a proposition primarily describing that entity, but rather one naming it. To that extent the
proposition is of the type that Peirce called “Dicent Indexical Legisign” to distinguish it from
proper propositions with a general, descriptive predicate; see Stjernfelt (2014, ch. 3).
7This crown, in turn, is a stylized version of a real, Danish crown: that of Christian V, forged
1670–1671 and subsequently used by absolutist Danish monarchs—currently on display in the
Rosenborg Castle close to the barracks.
8Thanks to Svend Erik Sjøtlow for information as to the banner tips.
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Implicitly, moreover, the cartouche refers to (1) the building upon which it is
placed—he Rosenborg barracks—and (2) by metonymy, to the institution housed
in that building: the queen’s household troops (regularly marching the streets of
Copenhagen, a sight sought by some tourists). It may surprise that the military entity
celebrated by the cartouche—the queen’s life guard—is not itself named and only
indirectly referred to in the cartouche by means of the banner tips which are scarcely
identifiable from below; it is primarily contextually indicated by the placement of
the cartouche on the building (a barracks, however, that is widely known to be the
base of exactly this military unit). All of these references are not quasi-propositions
in Ingarden’s sense—they refer to real entities. So, the cartouche as a whole is a
complex proposition which might be linguistically paraphrased as follows: “These
are the barracks of the Danish Royal Life Guard which came into being 1658,
received royal celebration at ten occasions over centuries in the shape of particular
flags and was celebrated in the year 2008 in the reign of Margrethe 2nd.” This is
not to say there are no Ingardenian quasi-propositions involved—the shield itself
does not refer to any existing entity, but rather has a general, fictive status. The same
goes for the arrangement as a whole—it does not refer to an existing shield behind
which the ten flags have actually been so positioned. The flags thus involve both real
reference—to the ten standards in the ownership of the Guard, several of them still
in daily use—and quasi-reference, namely to their arrangement. Thus, the reference
to those flags is made in a general way, involving spots of indeterminacy. The tips
of the banners are gilded, thus actually depicting the color of the real tips while the
flags themselves are left in bronze without such explicit reference. It was exactly the
closer interpretation of some of these Unbestimmtkeitsstellen—those presented by
the flags—which became the focus of the bitter strife over the monument.
The public conflict over the cartouche addresses the content of these slots of
indeterminacy. The protesting officer and his parliamentary support claimed that
the (supposedly) increasingly green color of those flags due to the corrosion of
bronze constituted an emerging meaning, running counter to the intended, patriotic
celebration of the Royal Guard in the monument. The green color, so they argued,
would appear, over time, as that of Islamic flags, celebrating victorious Muslim
armies—thus implicitly attacking Danish troops at the time serving in Afghanistan
and Iraq by giving the victory to their enemies, stabbing the Danish army in the
back, even at a central and symbolic location in Copenhagen. This interpretation
builds, it is true, on potentialities implicit in the genre of the artwork: the cartouche
as a celebration of particular military units. In the absence of any direct reference to
the Danish royal guard—so it seems—the empty slot of reference would instead by
occupied by Islamist forces via the green color sometimes displayed in the banners
of such forces (black being another color often used by Islamic armies).
Why, however, is such an interpretation wrong? It has several reasons, one
of which is very general, going beyond genre rules of cartouches, pertaining
to conventions for interpreting bronze sculpture as such. The greenish or light
turquoise colors of bronze or copper statues, sculptures, figurines, artwork, jewelry,
etc. are generally not interpreted as referring to the colors of the objects depicted
by those artworks. This, of course, is conspicuously evident in many bronze statues
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depicting persons, real or imagined. Take as an example the iconic Statue of Liberty,
originally French and mostly known for the large copy in the harbor of New
York, presented to the US by France at the centenary celebration of the American
Revolution in 18769:
Here, it would seem pretty strange to assume that the light green-bluish color
of the exposed body parts of this female deity should be taken to depict her actual
skin color. If we should not assume she was a Martian, that she suffered from a
severe hangover or indulged in body paint, we have no reason to assume that her
complexion is green, and she is generally not interpreted in such a way. This holds,
in general, for bronze artworks. The gradual green verdigris (literally: “green-gray”)
corrosion color assumed by bronze objects exposed to changing weather, covering
the bronze surface by a thin layer of copper carbonates and other copper salts,10
does not pertain to the color of the object portrayed. This is an example of the very
general regularity that certain parts or aspects of the artwork as a material object may
enter into the (quasi-)propositions that it claims to hold about certain indicated and
depicted objects—while other parts or aspects of the art object do not so participate.
As noted, this distinction, in the single case, has several sources—one is the very
genre of the artwork, another is indications provided by the particular artwork itself.
9Originally titled La Liberté éclairant le monde, designed by Frédéric Auguste Bartholdi who also
made a smaller copy at the Pont de Quenelle in Paris 1875. The large New York version was
inaugurated in 1886.
10Pure water supposedly results in copper carbonate making up the main part of the chemical
substance of patination; dependent upon the character and pollution of rain, copper sulfides,
chlorides, etc. may add to the corrosion, sulphur giving a more brownish hue while chlorides will
result in a more green hue.
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As to the former source, we already indicated how bronze sculpture is not
generally supposed to refer to green or greenish objects. This, however, is not a
law but rather a rule-of-thumb convention of tradition. Bronze artworks do exist
which make special use of the green corrosion color for (quasi-)proposition aims.
Take, e.g., a set of earrings such as those below, the accompanying sales text making
this proposal to the potential customer: “Let your inner and outer beauty blossom
by adding these fetching Apple Green Patinated Lily Pad Earrings to your look.”11
The leaf-shaped trinkets evidently, in a general way refer to foliage (the text
proposes lily pad, other internet texts propose geranium), the green color here
assuming part of the work’s quasi-proposition, contrary to the general interpretation
of bronzes and supported by the organic-looking shape of the objects.12 The
anti-cartouche protesters, however, did not go into such arguments—they simply
assumed that green in the artwork immediately refers to green in the world.
There are, however, further constraints on the filling-out interpretation of art-
works, those of indications given in the work itself or its immediate context, that
which Ingarden calls “schematic aspects held-in-readiness.” The sources of such
schematic aspects are several. Let us take such potentialities of the work one by
one. A first observation here is that the green shade assumed over the years by
bronze exposed to weather conditions is a very light, slightly bluish green—rather
11Earrings by John S. Brana, http://www.handcrafted-earrings.com/apple-green-patinated-lily-
pad-handmade-earrings-small.
12The character of the patination in the earrings is not indicated. The darker green seems to indicate
patination may have involved ferric salts sometimes used for such effects.
Green War Banners in Central Copenhagen: A Recent Political Struggle Over. . . 219
far from the heraldic focal green used by some Muslim flags (e.g. the Saudi Arabian
national flag depicting the prophet’s sword and the Islamic declaration in white on
green). So even in the case that the color of the bronze flags of the cartouche were
in fact taken to form part of the artwork’s proposition, it is by no means evident that
these banners would resemble nor represent Islamic standards. This is connected to
the cartouche forming a subgenre of heraldry. All of the world’s official flags, in
fact, use a rather small, selected amount of focal colors evolved out of the European
heraldic tradition,13 and both the green and the blue allowed by that system lie far
from the corrosion colors of copper and bronze. So the formal, heraldic character
of the cartouche forms a genre constraint implying, as potentialities inherent in
the artwork, only that small palette of focal colors, effectively ruling out the
interpretation of the bronze verdigris hue as an actual flag coloring. This potentiality
of the work, then, originates from its genre as a piece of heraldry.
Another potentiality stems from the fact that, in the work itself, clear indications
are given of the Danish, patriotic character of the work—most conspicuously, of
course, by the monogram of the Danish queen which firmly anchors the reference
as the Danish royal dynasty and, by metonymy, its associated military units. This
potentiality thus stems from the work read as involving a real proposition referring
to the Danish queen. Such an object reference, then, involves the potentiality of
the flags being filled-in as Danish national flags. For the militarily knowledgeable
observer, furthermore, the individual tips of the ten banners form references to
the ten royal banners owned by the Guard, in an even stronger way indicating the
potentiality of them being Danish banners to be filled in with red and white.14
In the immediate context, finally, the very mounting of the cartouche on the
roof of a centrally located and historically significant Danish barracks involves a
potentiality pointing in the same direction: this artwork celebrates a specific Danish
military regiment housed in that building, closely connected to the royal dynasty of
Denmark.
All these aspects of the work thus perform the role of “aspects held-in-readiness”
indicated by Ingarden. Moreover, all three point in the same direction: they clearly
lead the observer in the direction of making a filling-out interpretation of the
standards in the cartouche as Danish flags rather than Muslim war banners.
13The standard colors of European heraldry fall in two groups, so-called metals, named or and
argent (yellow and white) and colours, comprising azure, gules, purpure, sable, and vert (blue, red,
purple, black, and green), sometimes adding tawny (orange). The particular value of those colors
are close to the focal colors (as prototypical or best examples of each linguistic color category) and
have a large degree of universality, cf. Berlin and Kay (1969). Most world, state, regional, military,
etc. flags obey variants of this color code, effectively ruling out the hue of verdigris as a possible
flag shade.
14For the average observer standing on the ground, however, the detail of the ten banner tips is
hardly visible to the degree that they can be individually identified as referring to really existing
flags—despite the fact that the gilt of the tips draws attention to them. Furthermore, the expert
knowledge of the banner tips is not immediately available to most average observers. Still, the
other potentialities of the work should more than suffice to prevent the interpretation of them as
islamist war banners.
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Of course, expression is free, and nobody should be in a position to prevent the
protesting officer and his political aide from freely associating the greenish-gray
banners with whatever they may fancy. But simultaneously, structures both of the
general genre character of the work, the particular qualities of it and references
made by it, and its very contextual placement allow us to argue for an interpretation
that is simply correct because in conformity with both conventions about bronzes,
genre regularities—and in conformity with central aspects of the work itself. There
is little doubt, however, that the claims of the enraged guardsman and his political
supporter correspond to real psychological experiences with the artwork. This case
then also goes to show the relativist dangers of psychologistic theories of art.15 For
how could we argue against their—or any other—interpretation if psychology was
really the last key to interpretation?
This particular case thus served to display the less than sensational lack of
elementary aesthetic capability and sensibility in an ex-life guard officer and
a prominent parliamentarian—but apart from that, the struggle also served to
make publicly known an artwork that would, in all probability, have remained in
comparative oblivion in the world outside particular military circles without the
protest. Probably few if any would have wondered, at all, what were the more precise
meanings of this pretty traditional piece of art.
This is exactly the reason why it may throw some light upon the interpretation of
artworks also on a broader scale. The very traditional and non-spectacular character
of the cartouche makes it clear what an elementary thing it is for an artwork to
perform not only quasi-propositional but also ordinary propositional tasks proper,
in a very unproblematic, even trivial way. The funny thing is that this seems to lie
beyond—or below—the grasp of much contemporary theory of art to which it may
seem to be decidedly below the dignity of art to perform simple, propositional acts
of reference. But the cartouche case may make it obvious that for large parts of
art history—and in most other sectors of society besides modern art, institutionally
speaking—the combination of aesthetic elaboration and propositional reference is
the rule rather than the exception.
It certainly seems to be a very basic issue in the filling-out in artworks that
the saturation of fictive quasi-propositions goes hand in hand with that of real
propositions. In Paul Auster’s New York Trilogy, the frequent references to actual
existing New York landmarks, structures, and streets afford the filling-out with
actual or mediated impressions of those cityscapes, and they form, in turn, the
frame for the filling-out of quasi-propositions pertaining to the fictive characters
of the work. In Peirce’s theory of propositions, much emphasis is placed on what he
calls collateral information or collateral observation. This concept refers to the fact
that, in order to understand any proposition, the interpreter must have an already
established source of reference to the object referred to by the proposition—for
the Kantian reason that no description suffices to identify an object definitely. The
15I argue against the current renaissance of psychologism in ch. 2 of Stjernfelt (2014). Already in
1937, (Ingarden 1974) eloquently did the same thing with reference to aesthetics in particular.
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subject term of a proposition refers to some object, but in order to identify that
object, the interpreter must be able to refer that object to an already-known frame of
reference independent of the proposition. If that were not the case, the proposition
would not refer and hence degenerate to a mere predicate. Peirce:
Two men meet on a country road. One says to the other, “that house is on fire.” “What
house?” “Why, the house about a mile to my right.” Let this speech be taken down and
shown to anybody in the neighboring village, and it will appear that the language by
itself does not fix the house. But the person addressed sees where the speaker is standing,
recognises his right hand side (a word having a most singular mode of signification)
estimates a mile (a length having no geometrical properties different from other lengths),
and looking there, sees a house. It is not the language alone, with its mere associations
of similarity, but the language taken in connection with the auditor’s own experiential
associations of contiguity, which determines for him what house is meant. It is requisite
then, in order to show what we are talking or writing about, to put the hearer’s or reader’s
mind into real, active connection with the concatenation of experience or of fiction with
which we are dealing, and, further, to draw his attention to, and identify, a certain number
of particular points in such concatenation. (“The Critic of Arguments,” 1892, 3.418)
So, in understanding an Ingardenian quasi-proposition, we must be able to
identify the fictive object to which it refers by the reference to some ordinary
proposition given by the work, ultimately locating the fictive events in some
connection to reality. It may be, indeed, in very general or vague terms (“Once
upon a time in a land far away : : : ”), or it may be in very particular, precise terms,
indicating precise real world time and place-coordinates in relation to which the
fictive object is located. This might not be so surprising; more important is it that
those real propositions simultaneously and importantly contribute to the aspects-
held-in-readiness which permit the interpreter, in many cases very easily, even
automatically, to perform the filling-out of the spots of indeterminacy of the work,
be they presented in quasi- or real propositions. As when the real propositions in the
cartouche example pertaining to the Danish queen and Copenhagen barracks allows
us to abduct that the standards involved are indeed Danish flags rather than Islamist
war banners.
This, however, does not seem to lie in Ingarden’s original theory. Just like his
theory suffers from a too sharp, dualist distinction between fully determinate per-
ceptions and partially indeterminate artworks,16 his very sharp distinction between
works consisting of quasi-propositions and those of real propositions must be
softened up by a more continuous relation between the realms of the quasi and
the real. Ingarden, when dealing with the literary work, actually did take a step in
that direction by distinguishing between degrees of quasi-propositions. Thus, in The
Literary Work of Art, he distinguished between three levels of quasi-propositions:
(1) “in works which in no sense claim to be historical” (pp. 167–168), characterized
by the “total absence of the intention of an exact matching” (p. 168); (2) works in
16In Stjernfelt (2007), I argued that perception is more schematic than assumed in Ingarden—
making it more understandable how schematic filling-out of indeterminacy spots may achieve
quasi-experience effects.
222 F. Stjernfelt
which “the represented objectivities refer in a totally different, and at the same time,
if one may put it so, narrower manner to the real world” (p. 170) where the beginning
“of the matching is already present” (ibid.), but aimed only towards “a general type
of states of affairs and objects that would be ‘possible’ in a given time and milieu”
(ibid.); and finally (3) works where the matching intention extends to “the strictly
individual” as opposed to the general type, taken to be closest to genuine judicative
propositions (Ingarden’s term for ordinary propositions with full truth claims). So:
fictions involving no reality reference, general such reference, and individual such
reference, respectively. Even in the latter case, however, propositions identical to
real propositions will assume a different character as “simulating” or “duplicating”
the real objectivities, which would be referred to by the very same proposition
occurring in a scientific work, Ingarden maintains.17 The plastic ladder of quasi-
propositions developed here suffers, from our point of view, from being based on
the reference to the character of whole artworks such that it is taken to be the genre
definition of the work that determines the reference of each of its sentences through
and through. In an era of docu-drama and autofiction, such an insistence on the
absolute generic difference between fiction and non-fiction appears as quite too
rigid.18 This rigidity probably comes from the empirical bases of Ingarden’s theory
being literature in the classic sense of belles-lettres, at the time safely conceived to
be worlds apart from factual and non-fiction prose. In artworks like paintings and
sculpture, however, very often used to celebrate and refer to real-life characters or
objectivities, freely mixing or adorning these with fictitious figures and motifs, the
general artistic possibility of blending propositions and quasi-propositions appears
as a much more obvious possibility.
Moreover, this gives us another central source of aspect potentialities kept-
in-readiness—those indicated by real propositions partaking in the work, as the
example of the direct reference to the Danish queen in the Rosenborg cartouche.
It is that very same reference that appears as one of the main potentialities of the
17This issue must be kept apart, again, from two different possible attitudes to the same work of
art, the aesthetic and the extra-aesthetic:
There are two possible ways in which a work of art may be perceived. The act of perception
may occur within the context of the aesthetic attitude in the pursuit of aesthetic experience
or it may be performed in the service of some extraaesthetic preoccupation such as that
of scientific research or a simple consumer’s concern, either with the object of obtaining
the maximum of pleasure from commerce with the work or—as frequently happens in the
reading of literature—with the object of informing oneself about the vicissitudes of the
characters depicted in the work or some other matter of extra-literary fact about which a
reader can obtain information on the basis of the work of art (as for example by reading
Homer classical scholars seek to inform themselves about the life of the ancient Greeks,
their customs, dress, etc.). (Ingarden 1964, p. 200)
Our focus here is how ordinary, real propositions, part of the artwork, may participate in
yielding potentialities directing the filling-out concretizing the artwork into an aesthetic object.
18This is probably the reason why such potentialities are not considered in Ingarden’s account of
the aesthetic cognition process (Ingarden 1968/1973a).
Green War Banners in Central Copenhagen: A Recent Political Struggle Over. . . 223
work, granting that the banners behind the royal monogram should not be interpreted
after their metal surface—and that victorious Islamist standards do not wave over
Copenhagen.
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